Introduction
In Pawan Jain v. Sejal Anurag Jain[i], the Hon’ble Bombay High Court has, while adjudicating the issue of inheritance rights of a person accused of causing the dowry death of his wife under s. 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), significantly observed that any person who has caused the dowry death of a woman falls within the scope of disqualification prescribed under s. 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (‘HSA’). S. 304-B of the IPC is now s. 80 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNS’), with no change in the content of the provision. Further, s. 498A of the IPC is now s. 85 of the BNS with the exclusion of a certain phrase from the provision, ss. 300 and 302 of the IPC are now ss. 101 and 103(1) of the BNS with minor formal changes in the provisions.
Brief Facts
The Petitioner’s daughter, Lt. Sejal Jain, passed away in 2014, within a few months of her marriage with Anurag Jain, who, along with his parents, was subsequently convicted by the Ld. Sessions Court under ss. 304-B (dowry death) and 498A (cruelty by husband and/or relatives of the husband) of the IPC and ss. 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Following his daughter’s death, the Petitioner applied for a succession certificate, furnishing the particulars of the daughter’s heirs and next-of-kin, including himself, his deceased wife, and Sejal’s husband and in-laws.
In the application, the Petitioner asserted that the husband and in-laws were barred from inheriting the property belonging to his deceased daughter because they were directly responsible for her death. Thus, the Petitioner claimed to be the only surviving legal heir.
However, the tenability of the application filed by the Petitioner was questioned by the Testamentary Department (‘Department’) and the Petitioner’s contention of being the only legal heir. At the same time, the deceased daughter’s husband was alive. The Department rejected him on the ground that a person convicted for causing a dowry death cannot be equated with a murderer and, hence, cannot be disqualified under s. 25 of the HSA from receiving any inheritance. Aggrieved by the Department’s order, the Petitioner approached the High Court.
Issue
Whether the disqualification provided under s. 25 of the HSA applies to a person convicted of offences under ss. 304-B and 498A of the IPC, even if that person is not found guilty of murdering the deceased?
Held
The High Court, while rejecting the Department’s contention that questioned the Petitioner’s competence to be the sole legal heir of his deceased daughter, held that any person who causes the dowry death of a woman would be disqualified from inheriting the property of the deceased, as per the provisions of s. 25 of the HSA.
It was held that the disqualification under s. 25 is based on public policy, and the term ‘murder’ in this section should not be limited to the technical definition in s. 300 of the IPC but should be understood in its common parlance, including causing or abetting the death of the person whose property is to be inherited.
The High Court further held that no significant qualitative difference exists between convictions under s. 302 and s. 304B concerning the disqualification to inherit. Hence, the Department could not have rejected the Petitioner’s claim on the technical ground that the husband was convicted only under ss. 304-B and 498A of the IPC and not under s. 302 of the IPC.
Observation and Analysis
Under Hindu Law, the principles of justice, equity and good conscience disqualify and exclude a murderer from inheriting any interest in the property of the person murdered[ii]. It can be fairly assumed that s. 25 was enacted to give statutory effect to this principle.
In the case of acts with specified and special purposes, words and phrases must be understood and construed in a popular and easily understandable manner. A technical interpretation of commonly used phrases often tends to defy the objective of the act. Especially in the present context, wherein the HSA does not define the word ‘murder’, it is essential that the definition provided in a penal statute is not borrowed/imported to interpret the provision under s. 25 of the HSA pertains to inheritance. The phrase ‘murderer disqualified’ is used under s. 25 of the HSA should be interpreted broadly to allow disqualification based on a more widely accepted meaning of murder.
Thus, it is essential that beneficial provisions are interpreted to further the purpose of the Act/section and ensure that the interpretation aligns with the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.
End Notes
[i] Testamentary Petition No. 807 of 2020, Bombay High Court, Order dated 02.07.2024.
[ii] Minoti vs. Sushil Mohansingh Malik and Anr., AIR 1982 Bom 68.
Authored by Anshi Bhatia, Advocate at Metalegal Advocates. The views expressed are personal and do not constitute legal opinions.
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