Void Marriage, Valid Maintenance: Supreme Court Clarifies Alimony Rights Under Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur[i] delivers an important clarification in the domain of matrimonial relief under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (‘HMA’), particularly where a marriage is declared void ab initio. Through a considered reading of ss. 11, 24, and 25 of the HMA, the Court affirms that the grant of interim maintenance and permanent alimony is not precluded merely because the underlying marriage has been declared void.

While the Court affirmed the discretionary power of matrimonial courts to grant relief in such cases, it consciously refrained from laying down rigid standards. Instead, it emphasised that the outcome must hinge on the facts of each case, and notably, the conduct of the parties. While doctrinally defensible, this discretionary latitude leaves key interpretive gaps unresolved, particularly regarding the nature of ‘conduct’ and its operationalisation by courts. The judgment, therefore, strikes a careful balance between doctrinal consistency and judicial flexibility, though it may fall short of delivering the finality many had hoped for.

Brief Facts

• The parties were in a marriage that was subsequently declared void under s. 11 of the HMA.

• The key legal issue was whether the spouse from the void marriage could:

  • Claim permanent alimony and maintenance under s. 25; and

  • Claim interim maintenance (maintenance pendente lite) under s. 24, even while proceedings under s, 11 were pending.

• Conflicting precedents existed:

  • In Chand Dhawan[ii] and Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga[iii], the Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of maintenance claims in void marriages.

  • In contrast, decisions like Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav[iv] and Abbayolla Reddy[v] took a restrictive approach, denying maintenance on the basis that void marriages confer no spousal rights.

• Due to conflicting views, a reference was made to a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court by an order dated 22.08.2024.

Held

• The Supreme Court held that a spouse whose marriage is declared void under s. 11 is not barred from seeking permanent alimony under s. 25 of the HMA. The Court reaffirmed that s. 25 uses the expression ‘any decree’, which includes decrees under ss. 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.

• Interim maintenance under s. 24 is also permissible during proceedings under s. 11, subject to two conditions:

  • that proceedings are pending under the Act; and

  • that the applicant lacks sufficient independent income to meet their needs or the expenses of the proceedings.

• The Court relied heavily on its prior decisions in Chand Dhawan and Rameshchandra Daga (supra) to hold that the statutory language intentionally allows wide discretion to matrimonial courts. It dismissed the argument that only parties to a valid marriage can seek maintenance under s. 25, describing such an interpretation as unduly narrow.

• Further, it clarified that relief under s. 25 is distinct from claims under s. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) or s. 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Decisions such as Yamunabai Adhav (supra), which denied CrPC-based maintenance to parties in void marriages, were held not to apply to matrimonial relief under the HMA.

• Addressing hypothetical scenarios raised by counsel, such as fraudulent bigamy or marriages within prohibited degrees, the Court reaffirmed that ss. 24 and 25 are discretionary, and courts may deny relief if the applicant’s conduct is egregious or inequitable.

• The Court also criticised prior judgments for using derogatory terms such as ‘illegitimate wife’ or ‘faithful mistress’ to describe women in void marriages, declaring such language violative of constitutional values under a. 21.

Our Analysis

This decision represents a measured evolution in matrimonial jurisprudence under the HMA. The Supreme Court has consciously adopted a discretionary framework, one that empowers trial courts to grant or deny maintenance depending on factual nuances and the applicant’s conduct. This flexible approach aligns with the purpose of ss. 24 and 25, ensuring financial protection to vulnerable spouses, without automatically rewarding or penalising either party solely based on marital validity.

At the same time, however, the ruling leaves substantial ambiguity unaddressed. Most notably, the Court does not attempt to define the term ‘conduct,’ which is positioned as the fulcrum on which relief will now turn. Conduct, as a legal standard, is inherently subjective; its meaning may vary dramatically across jurisdictions, judges, cultural contexts, and evidentiary records. In sensitive or morally grey cases (e.g., bigamous marriages entered through deceit or incestuous void unions), courts are now expected to make nuanced moral and factual judgments without any codified guidance.

Further, the judgment implicitly reinforces the gendered tilt in Indian matrimonial jurisprudence. While the decision permits both spouses to claim maintenance, its practical application is likely to benefit women more frequently, owing to economic asymmetries and cultural dynamics. This is not a flaw per se, but it underscores the importance of judicial restraint and consistent standards, especially in a field fraught with personal, financial, and moral complexity.

Finally, although the ruling does not standardise outcomes, it provides doctrinal certainty on one point: void marriages do not extinguish financial obligations outright. The relief under ss. 24 and 25 continue to be available, but only where it is merited by context, equity, and conduct.

This case reaffirms the compassionate core of matrimonial law but also foreshadows litigation challenges around the interpretation of ‘conduct.’ It is a judgment that offers clarity on entitlement, but discretion on outcome, a step forward, but not the final word.

End Notes

[i] 2025 SCC OnLine SC 299.

[ii] Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan, (1993) 3 SCC 406.

[iii] Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga, (2005) 2 SCC 33.

[iv] Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav & Anr., (1988) 1 SCC 530.

[v] Abbayolla Reddy v. Padmamma, AIR 1999 AP 19.

Authored by Anshi Bhatia, Advocate at Metalegal Advocates. The views expressed are personal and do not constitute legal opinions.