Introduction
In a significant decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in Anil Kumar J. Bavishi v. Mahendra Kumar Jalan[i], dealt with the procedural intricacies of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) concerning offences under ss. 193, 199, and 200 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’). The present case stems from a scenario in which certain false declarations were made before a quasi-judicial forum, giving rise to a debate on whether private complaints are permissible for such offences where the alleged act was committed outside the jurisdiction of a judicial court.
Brief Facts
Mahendra Kumar Jalan ('Respondent') was accused of giving false evidence and making false declarations under oath, which allegedly constituted offences under ss. 193, 199 and 200 of the IPC.
Allegedly, these offences were committed while proceedings were ongoing before the Municipal Building Tribunal. Anil Kumar J. Bavishi ('Appellant') initially sought the Tribunal’s cognizance under s. 195 read with s. 340 of the CrPC; however, the application was dismissed, citing that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain such complaints.
Subsequently, the Appellant filed a private complaint before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, claiming that offences under ss. 193, 199, and 200 of the IPC were allegedly committed by the Respondent and materially affected the proceedings before the Tribunal.
The complaint was admitted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate but was subsequently challenged by the Respondent before Calcutta High Court under s. 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of the Magistrate’s proceedings, contending that the alleged offences fell within the ambit of s. 195(1)(b) of the CrPC.
The High Court observed that the acts of giving false evidence and making false declarations occurred during quasi-judicial proceedings. Thus, only the Tribunal, being the forum where the offence took place, could file a complaint. Thus, placing reliance upon procedural safeguards, the High Court quashed the complaint filed before the Magistrate.
Aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, the Appellant approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court, claiming that private complaints for offences committed outside a judicial forum, such as a Tribunal, were legally permissible.
Held
The Supreme Court clarified that s. 195 of the CrPC imposes a procedural bar on private complaints for offences under ss. 193, 199, and 200 of the IPC, limiting its applicability to ‘courts’ as defined under s. 195(3) of the CrPC stated that a Tribunal, being a quasi-judicial authority, does not fall within this definition.
The Supreme Court, while relying on Iqbal Singh Narang v. Veeran Narang[ii], observed that s. 195 of the CrPC applies only to offences committed during proceedings before judicial courts and reaffirmed that offences occurring in administrative or quasi-judicial forums are not covered by this procedural bar, thereby allowing private complaints to be entertained.
The Supreme Court observed that extending s. 195 of the CrPC’s procedural bar to non-judicial forums would unduly shield acts of perjury and false declarations in such contexts, emphasizing that the legislative intent behind s. 195 is to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings, not to grant immunity for offences committed outside its scope.
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision, holding that the private complaint was maintainable, and directed the Magistrate to proceed with the case on its own merits without being constrained by s. 195.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies that the procedural bar under s. 195 of the CrPC applies exclusively to offences committed before judicial courts; the Tribunal, being a quasi-judicial body, does not fall within this definition. Consequently, offences such as giving false evidence or making false declarations before such tribunals are not subject to the restrictions of s. 195, thereby permitting the initiation of private complaints for these offences. This interpretation ensures that individuals cannot evade accountability for perjury or false declarations made in quasi-judicial proceedings.
End Notes
[i] Criminal Appeal No. 5490 of 2024.
[ii] (2012) 2 SCC 60.
Authored by Nitish Solanki, Advocate at Metalegal Advocates. The views expressed are personal and do not constitute legal opinions.
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