Introduction
The Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh, in the case of Parisha Trivedi & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh[i], adjudicated an application for anticipatory bail filed under s. 482 under the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’), where the applicants sought relief in a criminal case stemming from a family dispute. The High Court’s judgment underscores how the anticipatory bail provisions under the BNSS afford broader discretion compared to the repealed s. 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code,1973 (‘CrPC’). Thus, the present decision benchmarks the evolution of the legal landscape around anticipatory bail, especially in cases where personal liberty is at stake.
Brief Facts
Parisha Trivedi (‘Applicant 1’) and her uncle Ashish Swaroop Shukla (‘Applicant 2’) visited her husband’s ancestral home in Rajnandgaon in 2016. During this visit, the applicants confronted Applicant 1's brother-in-law, Mr. Durgesh Trivedi, who, amidst an altercation, brought out certain belongings belonging to Applicant 1.
Mistakenly, Applicant No. 1 picked up Durgesh’s mobile phone, confusing it for her own. However, she promptly emailed Durgesh to inform him of the mistake and offered to return the phone without delay. The incident escalated, and a criminal complaint was filed against the Applicants.
Although the police filed a closure report, it was challenged and set aside, leading to allegations against the applicants under ss. 451 and 394/34 of the IPC. Apprehending arrest, the Applicants filed for anticipatory bail under s. 482 of BNSS.
Held
The High Court, while granting anticipatory bail to the Applicants, made the following observations:-
The judicial discretion of granting anticipatory protection had been widened by s. 482 of BNSS, vis-à-vis s. 438 of the CrPC. Under the anticipatory bail provisions provided for under the BNSS, the courts are not required to weigh specific guiding factors, such as the severity of accusations or the accused’s criminal history.
The High Court also referred to the 41st Law Commission Report, which first discussed anticipatory bail, noting its primary purpose as preventing the misuse of criminal procedures, particularly in politically or personally motivated cases. The Court highlighted how the anticipatory bail provisions provided under s. 482 of the BNSS aligns with the purpose and intent of granting anticipatory bail, as discussed in the aforementioned report, which prioritizes individual liberty while acknowledging necessary restrictions. Further, while referring to the 177th Law Commission Report, the High Court noted how liberty and equality are the most fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution*.*
Having found reasonable merit in the Applicant's case, especially considering Applicant 1 was visiting her own marital house and had also made efforts to return the mobile phone, no criminal intent was established. Thus, considering that the merits weighed heavily in favour of the Applicants, the High Court prioritized the applicant’s liberty over custodial interrogation and granted them anticipatory protection.
Our Analysis
The shift from s. 438 of the CrPC to s. 482 of the BNSS reflects a transformative approach in anticipatory bail jurisprudence. While s. 438 of the CrPC. mandated certain specific criteria such as the (i) seriousness of the accusation, (ii) the accused’s past criminal record, and (iii) the potential risk of absconding, s. 482 of the BNSS eliminates these obligations, enabling courts to focus on the unique circumstances of each case without adhering to predetermined factors. Moreover, it allows the courts to grant anticipatory bail by considering legal factors and social contexts that may instigate the perceived risk. Overall, this case exemplifies how s. 482 of the BNSS can empower courts to exercise greater restraint, ensuring that personal liberty is preserved in the absence of genuine reasons for detention.
End Note
[i] 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 9354.
Authored by Jitin Bharadwaj, Advocate at Metalegal Advocates. The views expressed are personal and do not constitute legal opinions.
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