No Conflict with the CrPC: Supreme Court Affirms Right to Fair Disclosure in PMLA Cases in Light of Reverse Burden on Accused

Introduction

In a landmark ruling that significantly impacts procedural safeguards in money laundering prosecutions, the Supreme Court in Sarla Gupta v. Enforcement Directorate[i] has clarified the contours of an accused person’s right to access documents in proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (‘PMLA’). The judgment harmonizes the PMLA’s special framework with the broader guarantees of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’), now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’), firmly rooting these rights in a. 21 of the Constitution of India.

More than merely settling the mechanical legal question of whether seized or unrelied-upon documents should be supplied, the decision lays down doctrinal clarity: the prosecution’s disclosure obligations are not confined to what it chooses to rely upon, and the accused’s entitlement extends to the very records seized from their custody or otherwise, regardless of whether the prosecution chooses to use them in court. By integrating this ruling with its earlier decisions, the Court has held that procedural fairness in PMLA cases cannot be reduced by virtue of the statute’s special status. In fact, the special nature of the statute makes it all the more important to ensure that the accused persons receive a fair trial and an adequate opportunity to defend themselves.

Brief Facts

• The present case came before the Supreme Court by way of two criminal appeals arising from the judgments delivered by the High Court of Delhi and the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. Criminal Appeal no. 1622 of 2022 arose from proceedings initiated after the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered an FIR against the appellants in 2017 under ss. 120B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) (now the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [BNS]) and s. 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PCA), concerning the accused’s grievance regarding missing and illegible documents. Based on this predicate offence, the Directorate of Enforcement (‘ED’) registered an ECIR and subsequently filed a complaint under s. 44(1)(b) of the PMLA.

• The Special Court took cognizance thereof and supplied copies of the complaint and some documents to the accused. The appellants moved an application for (i) relied-upon documents not supplied, (ii) illegible documents, and (iii) suppressed documents gathered during the investigation. The Special Court rejected the application, stating that only the relied-upon documents needed to be furnished. This rejection was upheld by the Delhi High Court, which held that ss. 207 and 208 CrPC (corresponding to ss. 230 and 231 BNSS) did not apply to PMLA proceedings, and the trial had not yet commenced.

• Criminal Appeal No. 730 of 2024 stemmed from a separate complaint filed by the ED in 2021. Searches under s. 17 of the PMLA were conducted in 2019, and the ED seized various documents. The appellants moved applications before the Adjudicating Authority and the Special Court for copies of the seized documents, which were denied on the ground that the investigation was ongoing, and charges were yet to be framed. The Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld the denial, holding that only relied-upon documents were required to be furnished prior to trial. However, it permitted the appellants to request a list of unrelied-upon documents. Both denials were challenged before the Supreme Court.

Held

The Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the High Courts and directed disclosure in both cases. It held that the accused in proceedings under the PMLA are entitled to receive true and legible copies of all documents accompanying the prosecution complaint filed by the ED, and of all records or instruments seized from their custody under ss. 17 and 18, regardless of whether the ED relies upon them. Recognising the reverse burden imposed on the accused under s. 24 of the PMLA and the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial under a. 21, the Court laid down a stage-wise framework for disclosure.

Right to Copies of Records/Documents Seized under Ss. 17 and 18 of PMLA

The Court interpreted ss. 17 and 18 of the PMLA in conjunction with ss. 20 and 21, and r. 4 of the PMLA Rules, 2005[ii]. It held that a person from whom records are seized is entitled, as a matter of right under s. 21(2), to receive true copies of such records, regardless of whether they are relied-upon by the ED. The Court clarified that while physical seizure of property only entitles the person to a seizure memo and inventory, seizure of instruments evidencing title, although classified as ‘property’, must be treated as ‘records’ in substance and supplied in true copy. Denial of access to such documents, the Court held, would violate a. 14 and a. 21 of the Constitution, as seizure under the PMLA does not amount to forfeiture. In Appeal No. 730 of 2024, the Court found that the Special Court and Punjab & Haryana High Court erred in denying access and directed the ED to furnish copies. 

Right to Copies of Documents Filed Along with Prosecution Complaint

The Court held that once cognizance is taken under s. 44(1)(b) of the PMLA, the procedure under Ch. XVIII of the CrPC (or Ch. XIX of the BNSS) applies, including ss. 200 to 204 (ss. 223 to 227 of BNSS). Noting that as per s. 204(3) CrPC, the accused must be provided with a copy of the complaint and accompanying documents, the Court clarified that this includes all documents filed with the complaint, including those obtained under s. 50 of the PMLA or annexed to any supplementary complaints. The Court further observed that although ss. 207 and 208 CrPC do not apply directly, their principles are applicable, as they promote fairness and are consistent with a. 21. It was thus held that the accused is entitled to legible and complete copies of (i) the complaint, (ii) statements recorded by the Special Court before taking cognizance, (iii) documents filed with or after the complaint (including s. 50 statements), and (iv) all documents accompanying supplementary complaints. The Court rejected ED’s argument that some documents, though filed, need not be disclosed merely because they are not relied-upon.

Right to List of Non-Relied Upon Documents (Non-RUDs)

Relying on In Re: Criminal Trials Guidelines[iii], the Court reaffirmed that the accused is entitled to a complete list of all documents, materials, and statements in the custody of the ED, even if not relied-upon. It was held that while copies of such documents need not be supplied at the outset, disclosure of the list ensures transparency and enables the accused to make an informed application under s. 91 CrPC at an appropriate stage. This obligation was held to be particularly important in PMLA cases, given the reverse burden placed on the accused even at the stage of bail under s. 45(1)(ii). Thereby reinforcing the need for procedural fairness and meaningful access to exculpatory material. 

Right to Seek Non-RUDs at the Stage of Framing of Charges

Referring to its earlier decision in Debendra Nath Padhi[iv], the Court held that the ‘record of the case’ under s. 227 CrPC includes only those documents relied-upon by the prosecution. Hence, it was held that at the stage of framing of charge, the accused is not entitled to seek production of non-RUDs under s. 91 of the CrPC, as only the prosecution’s case is considered at that point. However, it was noted that while there is no absolute bar on making an application under s. 91 of the CrPC before the defence stage, such requests will ordinarily not arise until the trial has commenced. The Court concluded that the accused must still be provided with a list of non-RUDs and exhibits to be used at later stages of the proceeding.

Right to Seek Non-RUDs at the Stage of Defence Evidence

The Court distinguished between the discretionary power under s. 91 of the CrPC and the mandatory nature of ss. 233(3) and 243(2) of the CrPC governs the defence stage. It was observed that at this stage, the Special Court must issue a process for compelling the production of any document or summoning any witness called upon by the accused unless it finds such a request to be vexatious, dilatory, or made to defeat justice. Therefore, the accused was held to be entitled to seek production of non-RUDs in the custody of the ED during defence evidence. It was also held that if the prosecution or its witnesses have withheld relevant documents, the accused may also cross-examine on this basis and seek an adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now s. 119(g) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023). The Court also affirmed that the accused may recall prosecution witnesses under s. 311 of the CrPC for further cross-examination based on newly disclosed documents, thereby affirming the wide scope of fair trial protections at this stage.

Right to Seek Non-RUDs for Bail Purposes

The Court held that an accused may invoke s. 91 of the CrPC at the stage of bail under s. 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA to seek production of documents, even if not relied-upon by the prosecution. Recognising that s. 45(1)(ii) imposes an extraordinary burden requiring the accused to show reasonable grounds to believe they are not guilty, the Court emphasised that procedural fairness demands access to relevant documents at this stage. It was held that a narrow interpretation that bars such access would defeat the right to liberty and violate a. 21. However, to safeguard the integrity of ongoing investigations, the Court directed that the ED may object to disclosure, and the Special Court must then examine the documents and assess whether disclosure would prejudice the investigation. If no such prejudice is found, the Special Court must permit access. The Court clarified that the object of ss. 24 and 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA is not to dilute the right to a fair trial but to balance the special burden with stronger procedural safeguards.

Our Analysis

This judgment marked a decisive evolution in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on fair disclosure in criminal trials, particularly under the PMLA. What sets this judgment apart is its doctrinal completeness: it not only affirms the accused’s right to access records seized and materials filed with the prosecution complaint but also constructs a clear procedural roadmap – stage by stage – on how and when such disclosures must occur. This is especially significant in the context of a special statute like PMLA, where the twin-condition and reverse burdens under ss. 45(1)(ii) and 24 impose an extraordinary onus on the accused to establish their innocence even at pre-trial stages such as bail. The Court’s approach effectively aligns statutory procedure with the constitutional commitment to a fair trial under a. 21, thereby filling a doctrinal gap that had led to inconsistent High Court jurisprudence and obstructive prosecutorial practices.

What also distinguishes this judgment is its seamless harmonisation of the CrPC with the PMLA. Drawing from its own reasoning in Bibhu Prasad Acharya[v], the Court reiterates that s. 65 of the PMLA does not merely permit, but in fact mandates, the application of CrPC provisions to PMLA proceedings unless a conflict is demonstrated. This decision thus extends the Bibhu ratio into the realm of procedural rights, importing provisions such as ss. 204, 233, and 243 CrPC into the PMLA framework – not as an afterthought, but as the primary mechanism by which fairness is preserved. In doing so, the Supreme Court appears to have subtly criticised the idea that PMLA’s special status can be used to override foundational procedural guarantees. The reference to Yash Tuteja[vi] and the incorporation of sessions trial provisions post-cognizance reinforce this position, establishing that the CrPC continues to operate as the procedural backbone of PMLA trials.

However, despite the commendable structural clarity the Supreme Court introduces, the judgment stops short of fully resolving the interpretive tensions surrounding s. 91 CrPC. The Court appears to endorse a restrictive reading of s. 91 by holding that non-RUDs cannot be sought at the stage of framing of charge, and that their production is permissible only at the stage of defence under ss. 233(3)/243(2), or exceptionally, for bail. While this classification may find textual support in the discretionary ‘may’ of s. 91 versus the mandatory ‘shall’ in ss. 233 and 243, it risks undercutting the broader jurisprudential trend favouring early-stage procedural fairness, particularly in complex economic offence cases where voluminous documentation forms the crux of the dispute.

This is a critical point because fair disclosure is not merely a CrPC compliance issue, but a constitutional one, which is woven into a. 21 through purposive interpretation. By bracketing s. 91’s utility too narrowly, the Supreme Court may inadvertently revive the very trial-stage ambushes and procedural opacity it seeks to eliminate.

This narrowing becomes more prominent when viewed against the backdrop of P. Ponnusamy[vii], where the Supreme Court, by a 2:1 majority, recognized the right to access even non-RUDs at the stage of commencement of trial, without deferring such access to a later ‘defence stage’ in view of the possibility of it containing exculpatory material for the accused. Yet, this decision does not engage with P. Ponnusamy (supra), let alone distinguish or apply it. This silence raises questions about consistency and may limit the judgment’s utility in situations where early production of documents containing exculpatory material could decisively impact framing of charges, discharge proceedings, or even bail proceedings. Had the Supreme Court expressly clarified that s. 91 CrPC could be invoked at or immediately after cognizance, subject to judicial oversight, it would have struck a better balance between preventing fishing expeditions and protecting against deliberate evidentiary suppression.

Nonetheless, this judgment affirms that the PMLA cannot become a self-contained exception to criminal due process. Its most enduring contribution lies in re-establishing a disclosure regime that is structurally sound, legally certain, and constitutionally anchored. Going forward, the challenge for courts will lie in ensuring that this judgment is not diluted in application. A robust judicial approach – where disclosure disputes are assessed in light of a. 21 and not merely s. 91 – will be key to operationalising the promise of this decision. To defence lawyers, this ruling is both a shield and a sword: it provides a framework to seek critical documents at different stages, while also reinforcing the argument that in special law prosecutions, the presumption of guilt must not eclipse the procedural right to contest it.

End Notes

[i] 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1063.

[ii] Prevention of Money Laundering (Forms, Search and Seizure or Freezing and the Manner of Forwarding the Reasons and Material to the Adjudicating Authority, Impounding and Custody of Records and the Period of Retention) Rules, 2005.

[iii] In Re Criminal Trials Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies and Deficiencies v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2021) 10 SCC 598.

[iv] State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568.

[v] Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya & Ors., (2025) 1 SCC 404.

[vi] Yash Tuteja & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2024) 8 SCC 465.

[vii] P. Ponnusamy v. State of Tamil Nadu 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1543.

Authored by Srishty Jaura & Shivam Mishra, Advocates at Metalegal Advocates. The views expressed are personal and do not constitute legal opinions.