Introduction
In the case of Ms. Rachna Khaira v. Google India (P.) Ltd.[i], the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) addressed allegations against Google India (P.) Limited ('Google') for abusing its dominant position by granting preferential treatment to the app ‘Truecaller’ in the android ecosystem. The case, filed under s. 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 ('Act'), focused on whether Google’s actions contravened s. 4 of the Act, which prohibits the abuse of dominant position.
Brief Facts
Ms. Rachna Khaira (‘Informant’) filed information against Google under s. 19(1)(a) of the Act.
Google was accused of granting preferential treatment to Truecaller by providing exclusive access to private contact information and certain android application programming interfaces (‘APIs’) while denying these to competing apps.
Additionally, Google allegedly favoured Truecaller due to commercial arrangements, including using Google’s cloud storage and ad services. These actions were claimed to have distorted the caller ID and spam protection applications market, creating a monopoly for Truecaller.
The Informant sought to compel Google to enforce its policies uniformly across all apps and ban Truecaller from making private contact information public. The Informant also sought to prevent favouritism to avoid a monopoly in the caller ID market and impose significant penalties on Google for creating and allowing this monopoly. The Informant also requested interim relief under s. 33 of the Act to temporarily block Truecaller from the Play Store until the issue was resolved.
Held
The CCI's view was that the relevant market was identified as the market for app stores for Android smart mobile OS in India. Google was dominant in this market, which is consistent with previous findings.
The Informant alleged that Google provided Truecaller with certain Android APIs to access users' contact book data. Google countered by stating that Android APIs are open-source and available to all developers, and the Informant did not provide any preferential access for Truecaller. The existence of other caller ID and spam protection apps on the Play Store indicates that Google does not restrict competition in this market. Thus, the allegation that Google limits competition by exclusively allowing Truecaller to share contact information is not substantiated.
Google clarified that its commercial relationship with Truecaller, involving Google Cloud computing services and Ad services, does not include any exclusivity provisions or clauses related to sharing non-public contacts. Without evidence, a mere commercial relationship between two entities cannot be assumed to grant any favourable or preferential treatment beyond the terms of their commercial arrangements.
The Informant alleged that Google allowed Truecaller to access data from the Android platform before banning such data harvesting through policy changes. However, no evidence was provided to show that this policy change gave Truecaller a competitive advantage over its rivals.
The Informant accused Truecaller of violating a Google policy by displaying real-world phone contacts and personally identifiable information of non-consenting individuals.
The Informant cited an experiment suggesting Truecaller was harvesting user data and that Google was permitting the unauthorised publication of users' contact details. Google responded, noting that the Informant mentioned a different Google Play Store policy for the first time and that the Informant continues to rely on a non-Play Store version of Truecaller. Google argued that the Play Store app only presented data the Informant had explicitly authorised for sharing during the experiment.
The CCI observed that the Informant failed to provide evidence that Google provided preferential treatment to Truecaller. Other caller ID and spam protection apps are available on the Play Store, indicating no restriction by Google. Despite opportunities to provide evidence, the Informant did not substantiate claims of preferential treatment or discriminatory practices.
The Informant alleged that Google allowed Truecaller to access data from the Android platform before banning data harvesting. Google clarified that the policy change in May 2021 was not a ban on authorised data collection but introduced a 'safety section' in the Google Play Store. This section aimed to help users understand data collection, sharing, security, and privacy. Developers must disclose how their apps use and share collected data.
The Informant provided no evidence that the Play Store version of Truecaller violated Google’s policies. Furthermore, no specific competing apps were identified as being harmed by stricter enforcement of Google’s policies.
The CCI observed that Google's commercial relationship with Truecaller did not include any exclusivity provisions related to sharing non-public contacts. No prima facie case of contravention of s. 4 of the Act was made against Google. Consequently, the information was ordered to be closed immediately, and no interim relief was granted under s. 33 of the Act.
Conclusion
The CCI rightly held that there was no merit in the allegations against Google for abusing its dominant position by favouring Truecaller. The investigation revealed that the Informant’s claims were based on an outdated version of Truecaller, and there was no evidence of preferential access to APIs or unauthorised publishing of contact information.
End Note
[i] [2024] 163 taxmann.com 724 (CCI) dated 24.06.2024.
Authored by Nitish Solanki, Advocate at Metalegal Advocates. The views expressed are personal and do not constitute legal opinion.
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